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The George W. Bush administration’s shift from the military option of a massive strategic attack against Iran to a surgical strike against selected targets associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),

reported by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker earlier this month, appears to have been prompted not by new alarm at Iran’s role in Iraq but by the explicit opposition of the nation’s top military leaders to an unprovoked attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The reorientation of the military threat was first signaled by passages on Iran in Bush’s Jan. 10 speech and followed by only a few weeks a decisive rejection by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a strategic attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Although scarcely mentioned in press reports of the speech, which was devoted almost entirely to announcing the troop “surge” in Iraq, Bush accused both Iran and Syria of “allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq”. Bush also alleged that Iran was “providing material support for attacks on American troops”.

Those passages were intended in part to put pressure on Iran, and were accompanied by an intensification of a campaign begun the previous month to seize Iranian officials inside Iraq. But according to Hillary Mann, who was director for Persian Gulf and Afghanistan Affairs on the National Security Council staff in 2003, they also provided a legal basis for a possible attack on Iran.

“I believe the president chose his words very carefully,” says Mann, “and laid down a legal predicate that could be used to justify later military action against Iran.”

Mann says her interpretation of the language is based on the claim by the White House of a right to attack another country in “anticipatory self-defence” based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. That had been the legal basis cited by then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice had in September 2002 in making the case for the invasion of Iraq.

The introduction of a new reason for striking Iran, which also implied a much more limited set of targets related to Iraq, followed a meeting between Bush and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Dec. 13, 2006 in which the uniformed military leaders rejected a strike against Iran’s nuclear programme. Time magazine political columnist Joe Klein, reported last May that military and intelligence sources told him that Bush had asked the Joint Chiefs at the meeting about a possible strike against the Iranian nuclear programme, and that they had unanimously opposed such an attack.

Mann says that she was also told by her own contacts in the Pentagon that the Joint Chiefs had expressed opposition to a strike against Iran.

The Joint Chiefs were soon joined in opposition to a strike on Iran by Admiral William Fallon, who was nominated to become CENTCOM commander in January. Mann says Pentagon contacts have also told her that Fallon made his opposition to war against Iran clear to the White House.

IPS reported last May that Fallon had indicated privately that he was determined to prevent an attack on Iran and even prepared to resign to do so. A source who met with Fallon at the time of his confirmation hearing quoted him as vowing that there would be “no war with Iran” while he was CENTCOM commander and as hinting very strongly that he would quit rather than go along with an attack.

Although he did not specifically refer to the Joint Chiefs, Fallon also suggested that other military leaders were opposing a strike against Iran, saying, “There are several of us who are trying to put the crazies back in the box,” according to the same source.

Fallon’s opposition to a strike against Iranian nuclear, military and economic targets would make it very difficult, if not impossible for the White House to carry out such an operation, according to military experts. As CENTCOM commander, Fallon has complete control over all military access to the region, says retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on military strategy who has taught at the National War College.

Douglas McGregor, a retired Army Lt. Col. who was a tank commander in the 1991 Gulf War and has taught at the National Defense University, agrees. “I find it hard to imagine that anything can happen in the area without the involvement of the Central Command,” says McGregor.

The possibility that Fallon might object to an unprovoked attack on Iran or even resign over the issue represents a significant deterrent to such an attack.

Former NSC adviser Mann believes the Iraq-focused strategy is now aimed at averting any resignation threat by Fallon or other military leaders by carrying out a very limited strike that would be presented as a response to a specific incident in Iraq in which the deaths of U.S. soldiers could be attributed to Iranian policy. She says she doubts Fallon and other military leaders would “fall on their swords” over such a strike.

Gardiner agrees that Fallon is unlikely to refuse to carry out such a limited strike under those circumstances.

Mann believes the Bush-Cheney purpose in advancing the strategy is to provoke Iranian retaliation. “The concern I have is that it would be just enough so Iranians would retaliation against U.S. allies,” she says.

But the issue of what evidence of Iranian complicity would be adequate to justify such a strike evidently remains a matter of debate within the administration. A story published by McClatchy newspapers Aug. 9 reported that Vice President Dick Cheney had argued some weeks earlier for a strike against camps in Iran allegedly used to train Iraqi Shiite militiamen fighting U.S. troops if “hard new evidence” could be obtained of Iran’s complicity in supporting anti-U.S. forces in Iraq.

But Cheney and his allies have been frustrated in the search for such evidence. Mann notes that British forces in southern Iraq patrolled the border very aggressively for six months last year to find evidence of Iranian involvement in supplying weapons to Iraqi guerrillas but found nothing.

After several months of trying to establish specific links between Iraqis suspected of trafficking in weapons to a specific Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard contact, the U.S. command has not claimed a single case of such a link. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, the U.S. commander for southern Iraq, where most of the Shiite militias operate, admitted in a Jul. 6 briefing that his troops had not captured “anybody that we can tie to Iran”.

Sen. Joe Lieberman, who is known to be closely allied with Cheney on Iran policy, has betrayed impatience with a policy that depends on obtaining proof of Iranian complicity in attacks. On Jun. 11 he called for “strike over the border into Iran, where we have good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers.”

Lieberman repeated that position on Jul. 2, but thus far it has not prevailed.

Source: IPS

*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, “Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam”, was published in June 2005.

Ali Larijani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, and Iran’s chief negotiator with international bodies over Iran’s controversial nuclear program, is reported to have abruptly resigned his post. 

Little information has surfaced thus far about Larijani’s reasons, but it can be assumed that the abrupt resignation by such a key figure suggests a serious crisis within the Iranian regime concerning how to handle the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. The Bush administration has warned Iran that it faces possible military action if it does not voluntarily abandon its uranium enrichment program.

It appears to be a significant domestic political boost at least in the short term for Larijani’s rival, President Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad’s spokesman Ghloam-Hossein Elham announced Larijani’s resignation at a weekly press briefing. Elham also said that another close Ahmadinejad ally, Deputy Foreign Minister for European and American Affairs Saeed Jalili, would probably replace Larijani.

On paper and often in practice, Larijani held more sway over Iranian foreign policy than Ahmadinejad. The SNSS formulates foreign and security policy under the authority of Iran’s Supreme Leader and the SNSS chief has thus played a more influential role than the president, who is merely one member of the council.

Although a staunch conservative, Larijani is a strong proponent within the Iranian regime for cooperation with the West, and is known to have been upset by anti-Israel rhetoric by Ahmadinejad that seriously damaged Iran’s international standing. As the main interlocutor with the West in Iran’s efforts to head off further sanctions and win agreement for its nuclear program to continue, Larijani’s cause was not aided by Ahmadinejad’s recent speech at the U.N. in which he declared the nuclear issue over.

Elham told reporters that Larijani had tried to resign before but the president had refused to accept his resignation. The two were rivals in the 2005 presidential election and have maintained an increasingly stormy relationship ever since. His departure indicates that the Supreme Leader was willing to side with Ahmadinejad in the power struggle. Unless the Larijani-Ahmadinejad friction was purely personal, this would suggest that Iran may be in no mood right now to acquiesce to U.S. pressure and suspend its enrichment efforts even temporarily.

Given Larijani’s experience and pragmatic outlook, his absence could deal a serious blow to Iran’s efforts to negotiate a successful outcome of its international dispute. He was scheduled to have another meeting on the issue next week with European envoy Javier Solana. He may be quitting in part to prepare himself to make a major challenge to Ahmadinejad in the next presidential balloting due in 2009. But if the nuclear standoff continues, Iran’s crisis may have significantly worsened by the time voters go to the polls.

–By Scott MacLeod/Cairo

The Iranian government announced Saturday that its top nuclear negotiator had resigned, a move seen as a victory for hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that could bring about an even tougher stance in ongoing talks.

Government spokesman Gholam Hossein Elham, said Saeed Jalili, a little-known deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, was to succeed Ali Larijani as lead negotiator effective immediately. Larijani in many cases held a hardline view on the nuclear standoff between Iran and the West but was also considered to be a more moderate figure than Ahmadinejad within Iran’s hardline camp. He was seen as more committed to a diplomatic solution over Iran’s nuclear program while Ahmadinejad is seen as not favoring talks with the West. Larijani’s resignation was interpreted by many here as giving Ahmadinejad a free hand in dictating his views to the less experienced Jalili.

Elham did not give a specific reason for Larijani’s resignation other than to say he wanted to focus on “other political activities.” “Larijani had resigned repeatedly. Finally, the president accepted his resignation,” Elham told reporters. The United States and some of its allies accuse Iran of secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iran denies the claim, saying its program is for peaceful purposes including generating electricity. Elham stressed that Iran’s nuclear policy would not change because of Larijani’s resignation. “Iran’s nuclear policies are stabilized and unchangeable. Managerial change won’t bring any changes in (those) policies,” Elham said.

Former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton said Larijani’s resignation was “a clear victory for Ahmadinejad” and shows that “the leadership is determined to continue with the nuclear program.” Bolton, who served as the Bush administration’s point man on the Iran nuclear issue before becoming U.N. ambassador, said the conflict between Larijani and Ahmadinejad is “part of the larger struggle for power after (Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali) Khamenei dies.” “It’s more about personalities and internal polices, but Ahmadminejad saw Larijani as someone with a different perspective on (nuclear) negotiations,” Bolton told The Associated Press, suggesting Larijani was more moderate. Elham said a meeting between the nuclear negotiator and the European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, scheduled for Tuesday in Rome would still take place. “Despite Larijani’s resignation, meetings … won’t change. Larijani’s successor will meet Solana instead,” Elham said. Ahmadinejad was elected president in 2005 and appointed Larijani, a former Revolutionary Guards Corps commander and a close ally of Khamenei, to replace Hasan Rowhani, considered a moderate politician. Ahmadinejad had accused Rowhani and his team of technocrats as weak and giving too many concessions in nuclear talks with European nations. After Larijani was appointed, Iran took a more defiant approach to its nuclear program.

It resumed uranium enrichment activities, leading to its referral to the U.N. Security Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2006. Iran’s refusal to halt enrichment subsequently prompted a resolution by the U.N. Security Council imposing sanctions on Iran in December 2006 and another resolution widening the sanctions in March. In 2006, Larijani rejected Western economic incentives in return for a suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities, saying the Security Council “should not think that they can make us happy with candies.” However, differences between Larijani and Ahmadinejad were revealed earlier this year when Larijani became upset after the president contradicted him on whether Iran would attend a meeting in Egypt to discuss Iraq. Larijani traveled to Baghdad in May to discuss Iran’s conditions for attending the meeting but was upset after a reporter at the Baghdad airport said Ahmadinejad had already confirmed that Iran would attend. Larijani’s absence during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Khamenei, last week further raised eyebrows in Iran’s political circles.

Before he was appointed, Larijani was the head of Iran’s state-run radio and television network and was seen as one of the hard-liners’ most effective weapon in curtailing former President Mohammad Khatami’s reform program. At the time, Larijani used the official media as a weapon to suppress democratic reforms and prohibited the broadcast of information that might have been harmful to hardline clerics.

Source: The Associated Press