Friday, August 3, 2007

Two Years Into Term, Ahmadinejad Grapples With Economy

Radio Farda’s Niusha Boghrati reports. Two years have passed since the former hard-line mayor of Tehran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, came to power on a pledge to improve the economic conditions for Iran’s citizens.Yet many believe that the economy has in the past two years revealed itself as the Iranian president’s Achilles heel.

“Iran’s economy is currently moving just on the edge of a collapse,” Paris-based economics professor Fereydoon Khavand tells Radio Farda. “Ahmadinejad’s decisions have led to economic chaos in the country. At present, nobody knows which direction Iran’s economy is heading or what the country’s economic goals are.”

Since Ahmadinejad’s inauguration on August 6, 2005, the Islamic establishment has taken a tougher line on a number of domestic and international issues, including Iran’s nuclear program.

Affecting Lives

But for many low income Iranians, it is the worsening economic situation that has most affected their lives.

In contrast to the previous reformist administration — which had made international relations and civil-society values a priority — Ahmadinejad won major support from economic promises, with the best-known among them his vow to “bring the petroleum income on people’s tables” accompanied by a campaign motto promising that “It’s possible, and we can do it.”

Yet critics say the pledge to battle poverty with which Ahmadinejad initially began his presidency has gone unfulfilled.

Economist Fereidun Khavand believes the reason for the “chaotic” economic situation is that the president “shifted the circle of economic decision-making from the Ministry of Finance and Economics, the Planning and Management Committee, and the Iranian Central Bank to the presidential administration solely.”

Among the tensions that Ahmadinejad’s government has encountered in the first half of its term, it has been economical dissatisfaction that has provoked major and widespread protests and challenged his policies.

Protests for workers’ unpaid salaries, nationwide teacher protests over low wages, and eventually protests against gasoline rationing in the country resulting in burned-out gas stations — these have emerged as the greatest symptoms of friction confronting President Ahmadinejad.

Occasional Eruptions

Within the general population, sharp price rises and a lower standard of living in Iran under Ahmadinejad’s administration have made his policies unpopular. In recent months, a number of significant protests and strikes by workers and employees over low or unpaid wages have been reported in Iran.

Perhaps the most vivid example of unrest came in the form of well-attended protests and demonstrations organized by Iranian teachers in March and April 2007 to call for higher wages.

The protests were confronted by the government, and hundreds of teachers across the country were arrested and detained.

“How I, my wife, and my two kids are supposed to live on 220,000 tomans ($240) a month when rent for our apartment alone is 180,000 tomans ($200) a month?” one of the protesting teachers who was arrested and spent a day in detention asked. ” Where is the oil money that the government was supposed to distribute equally?” another protesting teacher in Eslamshahr asked, according to ILNA.

In two years of Ahmadinejad leadership, what critics have described as a “mishandling of the economic administration” has led to a sharp rise in the inflation rate, resulting in an unprecedented increase in prices across the country.

While the government says the inflation rate is currently between 12 and 13 percent, sources like Iran’s Parliament Research Center indicate that the number is up around 20 percent.

Nevertheless “even an inflation rate of 12 percent is still far above the inflation rates of all other countries in the region, with the exception of Palestine and Iraq,” Khavand says.

Slippery Slope

Khavand attributes Iran’s economic problems to Ahmadinejad’s disruption of international relations with the outside world, which he says have led international investors to look elsewhere than Iran. “Today, Ahmadinejad only manages the country on a day-to-day basis with the help of oil revenues,” Khavand tells Radio Farda.

An open letter signed by 57 economists from around the country and issued in June lambasted Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and accused him of “ignoring the basic principles of economy.” The university professors warned in the letter that “government mismanagement is inflicting a huge cost on the economy and underscore that high oil revenues over the last two years can only delay the imminent economic crisis.”

That crisis was not long in coming. On June 26, angry Iranians attacked several gas stations to protest the government’s suddenly imposition of long-threatened new limits fuel rationing. The Oil Ministry announced the start of the new rationing regime just three hours before it was due to begin at midnight, and the rush of the car owners seeking one last chance to fill up appeared to spark the violence.

According to the head of the Council of Gas Station Owners, Nasser Raisifar, at least five gas stations were totally destroyed in blazes set by angry motorists in Tehran. Many other gas stations were seriously damaged in the capital without being completely destroyed.

The new rationing plan allows the owners of private automobiles just 100 liters of heavily subsidized gas per month. Taxi drivers are allowed 800 liters a month at the subsidized price.

Gasoline is sold at a price of around 1,000 rials ($0.11) per liter in Iran, about one-fifth of its actual cost.

Iran is the second-largest exporter of crude oil among Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But its low refining capacity means it has had to import more than half of the gasoline it consumes. To keep prices low, the government subsidizes gasoline sales, saddling it with enormous costs.

Costly Mistakes?

Critics concede that escalating gasoline prices and tighter rationing were theoretically a necessary step for Iran, but they say the timing and mechanism for implementation were inexpertly handled.

“Was it a proper move? The answer is yes. But was it a moral move? Definitely no!” Parviz Mina, an energy expert tells Radio Farda. “In a period when the country suffers from a sick economy, when people cannot afford daily living, and when wages are delayed for months, economic morality surpasses theory — especially for one of the top energy resources in the entire world.”

The new rationing also sparked an overnight increase in already high prices for related and unrelated goods, from taxi fares to cigarettes to foodstuffs.

“The prices of meat, beans, rice, and fruit went up,” Peyman Pakmehr a journalist based in Tabriz, told Radi Farda less than 24 hours after the new rationing kicked in. “When people ask shopkeepers why, they say it was because of the rise in gasoline prices.” According to official government reports, 12 percent of the population in Iran lives under the poverty line; some skeptics think the true figure is much higher.

Ahmadinejad has defended his economic policies and called on his critics to offer practical solutions. His government has accused the media of exaggerating economic problems.

The Iranian president has on his numerous provincial trips sought to associate with the masses of the lower economic classes, but some observers think that what they describe as Ahmadinejad’s “economic failure ” has led to a decrease in his popularity.

“We all welcomed him to town cheerfully and with open arms when Mr. Ahmadinejad came to Semnan,” a Radio Farda listener said in a message left days after the launch of the new gasoline rationing. “That, he can be sure, would never happen again!”

Posted by Editors at 22:38:47 | Permalink | No Comments »

Saturday, July 28, 2007

How Supreme Is Iran’s Supreme Leader?

Reports that Ayatollah Ali Meshkini has either died or is on the brink of death shed light on the nature of power in Iran. Meshkini is speaker of the Assembly of Experts — a body that, despite its traditionally minor role in Iranian politics, is constitutionally empowered to not only elect a new Supreme Leader if the post becomes vacant, but also to dismiss a sitting leader. Current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cannot be pleased that this body may now be headed by deputy speaker Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, a former president known to be a wily comeback artist.Although Khamenei has taken full advantage of the constitution to make the Supreme Leader the ultimate arbiter of Iranian politics, that could change depending on his health and Rafsanjani’s scheming. 

Khamenei as Supreme Leader

When revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, a backroom deal brokered by Rafsanjani put then-president Khamenei in his place. Khamenei’s religious credentials were widely ridiculed at the time. He was remarkably weak in his early years; real power was in the hands of new president Rafsanjani, to Khamenei’s disgust.

But by the mid-1990s, Khamenei had consolidated control. His strength grew over the years to match the broad reach given to his office by the constitution. Today, appointed prayer leaders in each city and representatives in each major government office give him eyes and ears everywhere. He selects the members of the Guardian Council, which must approve all legislation passed by the parliament, or Majlis. He closely controls the country’s radio and television networks, whose director he appoints. He also appoints the heads of the clerical court and the regular judiciary, who in turn appoint the nation’s other judges. And he is head of the seminary system (rais-e howzeh).

In addition, Khamenei controls the key instruments of national and regime security: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the politically active Basij paramilitary, and the KGB-like Ministry of Intelligence and Security (charged with security operations both at home and abroad). Nuclear negotiations with the West are conducted by his representative with little or no input from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Khamenei is widely thought to be in poor health, though it is not clear whether he has any life-threatening conditions. He was badly injured in a 1980 assassination attempt in which he lost use of his right arm. He sometimes disappears from public view for long periods, fueling rumors that he suffers from depression. It should also be noted that one stereotype of traditional clerics is that some use opium.

The Assembly of Experts

The U.S. government describes the Supreme Leader as an unelected position. This contention, while incorrect in theory, is true in practice. The constitution empowers the Assembly of Experts to choose the Supreme Leader for a seven-year term. Yet, according to prominent dissident Mohsen Sazegara, “members of the Assembly must pass muster with the Guardian Council, whose members were appointed by the leader. That explains why no member of the Assembly has ever said anything critical of the leader in public session” (see “‘Lawful Crimes’ in Iran,” PolicyWatch no. 999, June 1, 2005).

Article 111 of the constitution empowers the assembly to dismiss the Supreme Leader whenever he “should become incapable [of] fulfilling his constitutional duties . . . or if any time it should be known that he did not meet some of the qualifications mentioned.” The assembly even has a committee for this purpose — according to Towhid Moharami, writing in the assembly’s quarterly journal Hukumat-e Islami (Islamic government), this body was reorganized as the “Constitutional Article 111 Investigation (tahqiq) Committee” in 2004, with seven members chosen by the assembly (the names are not announced, but cannot include leaders such as the speaker or his deputy). According to Guardian Council member Mohsen Esmaeili, the committee meets every two weeks. This suggests a rather active body. Even if the seven clerics only discuss the weather, the fact that they meet biweekly reminds Khamenei of the check on his power.

For years, this check has seemed only theoretical. But the Rafsanjani factor may change that. Although Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad handily defeated him in the June 2005 presidential elections, Rafsanjani was unbowed as he ran for election to the assembly in 2006. In a long interview with Hukumat-e Islami that summer, he violated a taboo by implicitly criticizing Khamenei: “It is not obvious that the most appropriate person is always elected [as Supreme Leader]. It is possible that in the election a mistake could be made.” Then, during the December election, he received the most votes — a result widely seen as a slap to the hardliners (Ahmadinezhad’s Tehran slate performed miserably in the concurrent municipal elections). Rafsanjani was then elected deputy speaker while the top spot was held by the politically inactive and often ill Meshkini.

Rafsanjani excels at turning obscure posts into power centers. As Majlis speaker in the 1980s, he became a central powerbroker between the feuding president (Khamenei) and prime minister (a post since abolished). Ayatollah Khomeini subsequently created the Expediency Council to resolve differences between the many power centers in Iran’s complicated government structure, later enshrined in the constitution. Although the council was initially weak, it acquired a large, active staff and a new headquarters next to the Supreme Leader’s offices once Rafsanjani stepped down as president in 1997 and was appointed council chair. Intriguingly, the council has the main say in what happens while the Supreme Leader’s post is vacant, at least until the Assembly of Experts elects a new leader.

Rafsanjani took full advantage of his success in the December 2006 assembly election to assert himself on the national stage. In early 2007 — a period when Ahmadinezhad was being criticized in the conservative press for endangering Iran’s national unity and security by acting too combatively, and when reports were circulating of Khamenei’s ill health (e.g., Fars News Agency stated that he was hospitalized briefly) — Rafsanjani began acting as if he were the real powerbroker. In February, he made a widely publicized round of visits to top ayatollahs in Qom. Rumors flew that, in addition to seeking their general support, he was sounding them out about reducing Khamenei’s power. Then, at the first meeting of the new assembly, he stated, “The Fourth Assembly of Experts could exercise its supervisory powers more than before.”

Khamenei came roaring back, however, with several fire-breathing major addresses around the Nowruz spring equinox holidays. The Supreme Leader reaffirmed the hardline stance on the nuclear program and asserted that any talks with the West had to be conducted under his strict control.

What to Expect Next, and Implications for the West

If permitted to remain at the head of the Assembly of Experts, Rafsanjani would pose a persistent and open challenge to Khamenei. Accordingly, the assembly will likely meet soon to place a politically inactive senior cleric atop the assembly, such as Mohammad Imam-e Kashani, the Tehran Friday prayer leader. Even in that case, however, Rafsanjani’s twin posts at the assembly and the Expediency Council give him a power base from which he can maneuver to limit or replace Khamenei.

In the event that Khamenei dies, the new Supreme Leader would most likely be a compromise candidate rather than either of the two polarizing figures said to want the post: Rafsanjani, a technocrat, and Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, an extreme hardliner openly dismissive of democracy. The senior clerics, the Majlis, the technocracy, and the revolutionary power structure (i.e., the IRGC, Basij, and the foundations that control the economy) all share a common interest in a weak leader with limited ability to check them.

For the West, there are many advantages if Iran’s leadership is weakened by internal disputes. Such an Iran would be busier domestically and therefore less able to concentrate on foreign adventures. It would also be more aware of its weaknesses and therefore more likely to compromise. To be sure, a weak Supreme Leader would presumably have less authority to impose difficult compromises on objecting factions. That, however, seems like a price worth paying in order to see a less powerful revolutionary leadership.

Source: Washington Institute For Near East Policy

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2638

Posted by Editors at 06:01:29 | Permalink | No Comments »